January-March 2000 Fathom Table of Contents Sections Diving & Salvage Deck Seamanship Electronics Material & Combat Systems Explosives & Weapons Engineering Systems Damage Control & Firefighting Industrial Hygiene & NavOSH Submarine Systems Cover Divers return from a 240-foot, mixed-gas dive on the sunken Civil War ship Monitor. Features Whatcha Gonna Do Now? The author urges divers to use operational risk management to deal with the risks related to an operation. By ENC(DV) Thomas McLaughlin Prepared for All the Risks of Deep Diving Canadian and U.S. Navy divers work together to recover victims and debris from the crash site of Swiss Air Flight 111. They prepare for all the usual risks involved, as well as one unexpected problem. By HTCM(MDV) Lino Matteoni, HMC(DV) Tod Keltner, and PH1 Todd P. Cichonowicz Articles What's the Weather? Ask the Buoy If you're looking for a way to supplement weather information used with your navigation briefs or other near-shore events, try Dial-A-Buoy, a new service provided by the National Data buoy Center. By Cdr. Kevin Nicholas The Downside of Head-of-the-Line Privileges Some junior officers learn a lesson about getting too anxious for liberty call. By PNC(SW) Nolasco Moselina A Funny Line? Not Anymore A Coast Guard seaman aboard an offshore buoy tender gets hit in the head while deploying a 5.5-ton buoy. By CWO2 Maurice Etiemble, USCG 15 Minutes of Fame Leaves Sailor Lame An EW2 fills his one arm to capacity and uses the other to climb a vertical ladder. He falls when he reaches the top and suffers numerous injuries. By CTO2 Ty Strong The Day I Learned Heavy Seas Aren't Funny An E-2C naval flight officer crossdecks to a cruiser to learn some lessons about how surface combatants operate in an air-warfare environment. In the process, he also learns some important lessons about the dangers of heavy seas. By Lt. Armin Heravi Want Reliable Sprinklers? Maintain Them Although you hope you never need your magazine-sprinkler system for an actual emergency, you can't afford to ignore maintenance on the system. By GMC(SW) Bill Fisher What You Don't Know Can Kill You A BMSN inadvertently deploys two SLQ-49 inflatable decoys when he raises a loaded launcher to make it easier to move a spool of line. By GMC(SW) Bill Fisher Second Verse Same As the First The ships are different, but the results are the same when an EW2 repeats the mistake made by a BMSN: pulling the stow pins on a loaded Mk-166, Mod 0, SLQ-49 launcher. By Ken Testorff Making a Doubting Thomas Despite following his ship's PPE procedures, a maintenance person is exposed to hydraulic fluid. By MMCM(SW) Tony DeJesus Alternative to Nagging Fuel Leaks Can Be a Killer Investigation into a main-space fuel fire aboard a Royal Australian Navy ship reveals a contractor had replaced all rigid piping on the diesel engines with flexible rubber hoses that ruptured. The author shows that many changes have occurred in the application, life cycle and criticality of these hoses. By MMC(SW) Philip Anderson A Mistaken Sense of Security A failure to follow procedures spells trouble for two Sailors who have to remove a steam valve and repack it. By MMC(SW) Philip Anderson Two Dips and I'm Outta Here After two dips in cold water while trying to replace some exterior fittings aboard an LPD, a young Sailor passes the job to his shipmates to finish. By DCC(SW) Richard Robinson, USN(Ret.) An Eye Full of Hazmat, But Nowhere To Go A Sailor with hazmat in his eyes heads to the nearest emergency eyewash station. There's just one problem: Gear is piled in front of the station, and he can't reach it. Is Your Galley a Breeding Place for Illness? Shipboard Sailors have to eat healthy to stay healthy. Unfortunately, they're at the mercy of some galley workers who don't always practice good sanitation and personal hygiene. By HMCS(SW) Richard Bulgin A Whistle Away From Death The author recalls a near-mishap he had as a PO2 while handling lines aboard a submarine. By MMCS(SS) Terry Fahringer Trapped on the Ocean Floor Researchers at the Naval Submarine Medical Research Laboratory have developed a computer software program designed to improve survival chances of a submarine crew if they're ever trapped on the ocean floor. By HMCS(SS) Brett Darnell Departments ORM Corner Attaboy! Ships' Safety Bulletin Whatcha Gonna Do Now? By ENC(DV) Thomas McLaughlin, Jr., Naval Safety Center It's another typical Navy day--one dive--but maybe, for a change, some early liberty. OK, let's do it right. The ship's tagged out, the weather's good, and the Mk-21 pre-dive checklist has been completed. You've finished, checked and verified the operational procedures. You've lined up the chamber and briefed the dive team, and everyone understands the job. The divers look and feel good (What else is new?). The standby diver is OK, and we have good communications and air. Code Alpha is closed up on the ship, as well as on the dive boat. The ship is announcing diver warnings every 15 minutes over the 1MC, and safety observers are stationed. Here we go. "Red diver, stand up, go to the ladder, go down the ladder, put your helmet awash, and do your in-water checks... Understand red diver ready to leave the surface. Give proper line-pull signals. Let me know when you leave the surface and when you reach the project. Give OKs all the way down... Red diver left the surface; chart man mark the time... Understand, red diver OK and on the project... Red diver, ventilate, ventilate... Red diver, circulate, red, circulate... OK, red, go to work." The dive is going well. As the dive supervisor, you are on top of things, and your team is working well together. The console operator and chart man are paying attention and keeping you informed of the maximum depth, compressor and bank pressures, as well as diver status. Your tenders are alert and keeping a good tend on the diver. Your standby diver and tenders are in the shade and resting comfortably. So far, so good. Suddenly, you hear a groan over the comms. "OK, red?" you ask. There's no answer. The chart man tells you he can't hear any breathing over the comms. Whatcha gonna do now? The unexpected can happen at any time, even to the most highly trained team. Believe me, the time to consider emergency procedures is not when a routine job suddenly turns downhill and those watches you're wearing begin to weigh a ton apiece. In diving, the initial reaction to an emergency must not only be correct, but timely. Unless you, the diving supervisor, have taken the time to consider what your actions are going to be before the dive starts, chances are you'll freeze when faced with an emergency. Volumes Two and Three of the U.S. Navy Diving Manual devote complete chapters to operations planning. They contain information you should follow for any job, no matter how trivial or routine, but that may not be enough. As a diving supervisor, you are responsible for the well-being of your dive team. You owe it to your divers to consider the correct reactions to likely emergencies before starting a job. Operational risk management (ORM) is a valuable tool for doing just that. Everyone should be familiar with these five steps of the ORM process: Identify hazards. An easy way to do this is to think through the major steps for the operation and list the conditions that can injure people, damage equipment, or degrade the mission. These are your hazards, or simply "what can go wrong." Remember, hazards can include such things as loss of money, time, security, and readiness, as well as unsafe conditions, when you're talking about mission degradation. To make this process easier, brainstorm with your peers, asking "What if...?" and thinking about cause and effect. Assess Hazards. After identifying the hazards, prioritize them based upon the severity and chance of occurring, so that you deal with the most significant hazards first. Make risk decisions. Using your prioritized list, determine if the benefits outweigh the risks. If they do, keep moving down your list of hazards. If the risk is unacceptable (e.g., death or permanent disability could occur) and you cannot reduce it, notify your chain of command and determine whether the operation is to be accomplished. Implement controls. To complete this step, identify the causes of your hazards. Once you have identified them, it will be easier to select controls, including engineering controls (weight test, limit length of hose), administrative controls (checklists, instructions), and personal protective equipment (wetsuits, gloves). Also, don't forget about training, an excellent method of hazard control. Supervise. As a dive supervisor, you must be aware of everything that is happening on your dive station. Make sure the controls you and your divers have implemented are, in fact, working as planned. Finally, keep alert for changes or new problems that might arise. When something changes, stop and reassess the operation before proceeding. Don't let new hazards creep into your operation. Stay alert and try to predict the next problem. It has been said that emergency planning is the single most important difference between a great dive supervisor and an average one. As the supervisor, it is your job to gather the dive team and do jobs that often are full of risk. We cannot remove all the risks, but with ORM, we can sort out the unnecessary ones so that we operate at the safest level possible to accomplish the mission. Getting back to our scenario...Whatcha gonna do now? Since you used ORM to plan the dive, you are ready to go. One of the hazards you might have listed is loss of comms. Because you considered this hazard, you are prepared for what you and your team will do if you lose communications. "Tender, send one to red diver," you calmly order. Your tender replies, "Sent one...received one." You can relax. Your diver is OK, and you still have comms. Now you've got time to figure out why your comms box isn't working. After looking around, your team discovers that the log man had accidentally kicked out the wires on the box with his big foot. Fortunately, it's just a matter of plugging the comms box back in. Once you've re-established primary communications, you discover the groan the red diver let out was just a sound of frustration after dropping a tool. Each job is unique and has slightly different risks to overcome. Study the task, use all your assets to formulate a plan, and spend time reviewing reactions to anticipated emergencies. You always should have the correct and timely answer to "Whatcha gonna do now?" To do anything less is to jeopardize your divers. The author's e-mail address is tmclaughlin@safetycenter.navy. mil. Prepared for All the Risks of Deep Diving By HTCM(SW/MDV) Lino Matteoni and HMC(DV) Tod Keltner, Naval Safety Center, and PH1 Todd P. Cichonowicz, CinCLantFlt Det., Combat Camera Atlantic For days in September 1998, the sound of divers breathing through their deep-sea helmets 180 feet below the surface vibrated over the loudspeaker of the mixed-gas console aboard the rescue and salvage ship USS Grapple. Canadian and American Navy divers worked in tandem, braving the cold waters of the Atlantic to recover victims and debris from the crash site of Swiss Air Flight 111 near Peggy's Cove, Nova Scotia. [Note: USS Grapple was the U.S. platform in this work. Divers from Mobile Diving Salvage Unit Two (MDSU-2) joined divers aboard Grapple. MDSU-2 divers used their new flyaway mixed-gas system, which marked the first time this system was used in auxiliary-rescue salvage.] When we got the call to help our Canadian counterparts in this mission, we knew we faced increased risk. Wrecked aircraft have lots of sharp metal surfaces, and we faced the long decompression times typical when using helium and oxygen (HeO2) for deep diving and salvage work. [Note: HeO2 lets divers go deeper without the effect of nitrogen narcosis, an intoxicating effect similar to that of alcohol.] In this case, though, there would be a problem we couldn't forget about, or it would sneak up on us before we knew it. That problem is oxygen toxicity in your central nervous system (CNS). Recovery of the wreckage involved HeO2 dives in 180 feet, with a bottom time of 40 minutes. Decompression time for these dives was 109 minutes. To have better control of the divers and to make it more comfortable for everyone, a recompression chamber was used for surface decompression. This option allowed us to do some in-water decompression, with the rest done in the chamber. The most critical part of in-water decompression is when a diver is at the 50- or 40-foot decompression stop. At these stops in HeO2 diving, 100 percent oxygen is used to speed up the decompression. It's then that CNS oxygen toxicity can sneak up on you. Some of the symptoms are vision problems, hearing difficulty, muscular twitching, nausea, irritability, dizziness, and the worst one, convulsions. We came face to face with this toxicity during one of our dives. The dive side was manned, and everyone was at his station doing what he had been trained to do. This typical setting found tenders tending the divers' umbilical cords. Meanwhile, the standby diver and his tender were ready to help if needed, the phone talker was listening to the divers, and the console operator was watching the pressure gauges to ensure the divers had enough gas pressure. The master diver, who was the dive supervisor for the dive in progress, was checking to see if all the people were doing their jobs. The pair of divers in the water had completed a routine dive and were decompressing at their 40-foot stop. Everything was fine until red diver suddenly reported to topside that his buddy, green diver, had gone into convulsions. After ensuring that red diver had control of his buddy, the master diver deployed the standby diver to help. Green diver regained consciousness briefly but went into convulsions again. Topside, the master diver told everyone there was an in-water casualty. The dive side was preparing to receive the divers when green diver again regained consciousness. Once red diver and the standby diver made sure green diver was OK and breathing on his own, all three divers were brought to the surface and completed their decompression in the chamber. CNS oxygen toxicity doesn't happen on every HeO2 dive. As the U.S. Navy Diving Manual points out, susceptibility varies from one person to another. The manual also says individual susceptibility varies from time to time, and, for this reason, divers may experience the toxicity at exposure times and pressures they previously tolerated. Because it's the partial pressure of oxygen itself that causes the toxicity, the problem can occur when mixtures of oxygen with nitrogen or helium are breathed underwater. [Note: In a gas mixture, the portion of the total pressure contributed by a single gas is called "partial pressure."] The actual mechanism of CNS oxygen toxicity remains unknown, but prevention is the key. The diving manual warns divers to take sensible precautions anytime they use high pressures of oxygen. "Make sure the breathing apparatus is in good order, observe depth-time limits, avoid excessive exertion, and heed abnormal symptoms that may appear," the manual says. As Sailors, it's our job to go where duty calls and do jobs that often are dangerous. We cannot remove all the risks, but with operational risk management (ORM), we can sort out those risks that are necessary and operate at the safest level possible to accomplish the mission. The e-mail addresses for the Naval Safety Center authors are lmatteoni@safetycenter.navy.mil and tkeltner@safetycenter.navy. mil. If you're interested in becoming a Navy salvage diver, contact your command career counselor. What's the Weather? Ask the Buoy By Cdr. Kevin Nicholas, Staff, ComPhibRon Six Thanks to the National Data Buoy Center (NDBC), which is a part of the National Weather Service, ship drivers have another tool to help them avoid troubled waters. The latest coastal and offshore weather reports are just a phone call away with the new Dial-A-Buoy system, which consists of 65 buoys and 54 Coastal-Marine Automated Network (C-MAN) stations linked to the Stennis Space Center in Mississippi. These buoys and stations are located in the Atlantic, Pacific, Gulf of Mexico, and the Great Lakes. With them, you can get wind direction, wind speed, wind gust, significant wave height, swell and wind-wave heights and periods, air temperature, and sea-level pressure. There are several ways to find the station locations and identifiers: * Using the internet (http://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/), you can review site locations and get more information about Dial-A-Buoy. * You can call Dial-A-Buoy at (228) 688-1948, then enter a fax number to receive a location map by following the prompts. You also can enter a latitude and longitude and find the closest station locations and identifiers. If you access Dial-A-Buoy with a touch-tone or cell phone, enter the five-digit (or character) station identifier in response to the prompt. You then will hear a computer-generated voice reading the latest buoy or station report. Give it a try. You may find it an easy way to supplement weather information used with your navigation briefs or plans for other near-shore events. Information in this article is courtesy of David B. Gilhousen of the NDBC. He wrote about Dial-A-Buoy in the August 1998 issue of Mariners Weather Log. At the time Cdr. Nicholas compiled this article, he was assigned to the Afloat Safety Programs Directorate at the Naval Safety Center. The Downside of Head-of-the-Line Privileges By PNC(SW) Nolasco Moselina, VFA-27 Land ho! After four months in the Indian Ocean, we were hitting our first liberty port--Phuket, Thailand. Because it was the monsoon season, the weather was wet and windy, which forced us to anchor the ship on the other side of a peninsula, a few miles from Patong Beach. Once the anchor was set, the sea-and-anchor detail secured, and the quarterdeck watch stationed, the OOD ordered, "Away the gig, away!" As the gig headed toward the beach with our CO, who had to meet some dignitaries, a line of liberty-loving Sailors looped around the ship's main deck. "Where are the liberty boats?" we wondered. As we learned, the crews on the contracted liberty boats hadn't gotten word right away about our last-minute anchoring change. It would take them two hours to reach the ship and start hauling us ashore. The thought of having to wait that long to enjoy a cold beer with some hot Thai barbecue on the beach was more than the junior officers (JOs) could stand. They summoned the duty boatswain's mate, and, in five minutes, the ship's motor whaleboat was in the water, racing to shore with a full load of JOs. The envy in our eyes soon vanished when thick clouds darkened the horizon. Moments later, rain was pouring, and a haze had settled around the ship. We stared into the haze and soon saw the boat-load of JOs heading back to the ship. They were drenched from head to foot, which probably explains why they didn't smile or say anything when we greeted them with, "Welcome back aboard!" They simply trudged below decks for showers and dry clothes, then returned to their spot at the head of the line waiting for the liberty boats to arrive. When the first small, wooden boat came alongside, it was loaded with fresh bananas, papayas and other local fruits our MSC had ordered for the crew. It didn't take a working party very long to unload the boxes, but the JOs weren't in the mood for any kind of delay. As soon as the last box was unloaded and the operator signaled the OOD he was ready to take people ashore, the JOs rushed down the ladder. Full of excitement, the first five ran to the starboard side to make room for their peers and a few enlisted people. These latter passengers, however, never had a chance to board because the sudden weight of the first five JOs on one side capsized the boat. If I'd had a video camera, I'd have had some footage for the "America's Funniest Home Videos" TV show, but no one was laughing. The capsized boat had trapped one JO and one boat crewman under it, and a strong current was carrying everyone else away from the ship. As the OOD called away "man overboard," other shipmates tossed life rings in the water. All the victims survived this incident, and everyone who still wanted to go ashore finally went. However, there was no more pushing and shoving at the head of the line. The author wrote this article from his recollection of events that happened while he was in his first duty assignment aboard an Adams-class guided-missile destroyer. A Funny Line? Not Anymore By CWO2 Maurice Etiemble USCGC Sweetgum (WLB 309) "The first lieutenant can always issue you another pair of safety glasses, but he can't issue you a new set of eyes." I learned that line many years ago while I was reading a Navy boatswain's mate training manual. The line probably stuck with me because it seemed humorous at the time. I certainly didn't see it as a great revelation in personal safety. My thinking has changed over the years, though, especially now that I'm the first lieutenant aboard a Coast Guard offshore-buoy tender. We have to hoist buoys that weigh more than 9 tons. We also work with concrete sinkers that weigh five times more than my sport-utility vehicle. One morning, we were in the final stages of deploying a 5.5-ton buoy. Our ship was "anchored" to the sea floor by the buoy's mooring chain and sinker. The chain was being held by a stopper, a spring-loaded device with an open top in which the chain rests. When the bridge watch gave the order to set the buoy, a deck crewman (a seaman) tripped the chain stopper with a sledgehammer, and the deck supervisor started lowering the buoy into the water. This event looked routine until I saw a dented safety helmet go spinning across the deck. It belonged to the seaman who had tripped the chain stopper. He was down on one knee, with blood streaming from his forehead. When he tripped the stopper, either the sledgehammer doubled back, or the corner of the stopper caught him as it released the chain. After what seemed like an eternity, the seconds of silence that followed my discovery finally were shattered by word for a corpsman to lay to the buoy deck. Fellow deck crewmen were giving first aid to the seaman a few seconds later when the corpsman and the captain arrived on the scene. Once the corpsman had stabilized the victim, a Coast Guard utility boat from a nearby search and rescue station took him to a hospital ashore. Doctors found his injuries weren't as bad as first feared, and they released him later the same day--with some stitches and a headache. As it turned out, I was able to replace the seaman's shattered and blood-stained safety glasses with a new pair. If he hadn't worn his safety equipment that day, the results would have been tragically different: a pair of eyes, or perhaps a life, that I could never replace. 15 Minutes of Fame Leaves Sailor Lame By CTO2(SW) Ty Strong, USS Oldendorf (DD 972) We all have dreams of being famous. Some even have dreams of being a daredevil or a stuntman--it seemed like the EW2 in this story did, anyway. All the script required him to do was carry a few items up a vertical ladder. Imagining the director sitting in his chair and the cameras rolling, the EW2 proceeded up the ladder. Because he wanted to impress the director for a future casting job, the EW2 loaded his one arm to capacity. He used the technique of a one-armed bandit to slowly but surely climb to the top. "Now for my 15 minutes of fame," the EW2 perhaps thought. "All I have to do is fall just right, and I'm a shoo-in for a future job--maybe in the next 'Star Wars' movie." He started falling backwards. With a keen eye, he spied a rigid-hull inflatable boat (RHIB) one deck below, so he hurled his body clear of the handrail and reached out for the RHIB. He missed it, though, and fell 25 feet like the hapless coyote we have come to love in TV cartoons. On film, the stunt would have looked perfect: plenty of blood, lots of screaming, and the sirens of rescue vehicles howling in the background. But the blood and screams weren't staged. Because he didn't want to make two trips up the ladder or do the unmanly thing and ask someone to help him, the EW2 won a trip to a hospital in an ambulance. Injuries included lacerated buttocks (from hitting the edge of the ladder while going to the RHIB), ligament damage to his left knee, and contusions to his head, arms and shoulders. Since leaving the ship, he has had numerous surgeries to his knee and continues in rehab. Most times, we do things because people say, "It's the way we've done it before" or because it's easier than asking someone for help. Let us apply this thinking to a tribe of people from long ago. One day, a hut with all their pigs in it burned down. While cleaning up after the fire, they discovered roast pig and had a feast. From then on, anytime they wanted roast pig, they burned down a hut. The old way isn't always the best way. Spend a few minutes looking at every situation and job and see if you can't make it safer for you and the next person. Navy people do a lot of jobs no one else will do because of the risks involved. We do them because we've found ways to reduce the risks. However, this doesn't mean we can't find even better ways. In looking for a better way, we also might find a safer way. Let's save our huts to hold the feast in. The Day I Learned Heavy Seas Aren't Funny By Lt. Armin Heravi, VAW-116 As an E-2C naval flight officer, I was selected to crossdeck to a cruiser in our battlegroup during work-ups off the coast of southern California. My assignment was to gather lessons learned and act as a liaison between the air wing and the air-warfare commander. I gathered a lot of lessons learned, but the most important one had little to do with air warfare. I spent the first few days wandering around combat observing and asking questions, such as, "Hey, why do you guys do it that way?" and "What happens if I push this button?" I had begun to feel confident. Little did I know what life in CIC really entailed. One night around 2100, I was in combat when the seas began to get rough. I had gone through an entire work-up cycle and a cruise, so I could remember a few times when the carrier had bounced around a bit. However, that experience hadn't prepared me for the sight unfolding before me. Sailors were struggling hand-over-hand just to get to the other side of the space. Coffee cups were rolling around on the deck, their contents having been splashed everywhere. Binders and papers were sliding from one side of the space to the other. I found the situation amusing, as I sat safely ensconced in the TAO's chair. My amusement, however, came to a screeching halt when I looked up and saw a 300-pound equipment rack sliding toward an OS2. It was about to tip over on him. The OS2 and shipmates noticed the problem in time to grab the rack before it could tip over. They lashed it to the deck with line, and you can bet the OS2 kept his eye on it for the rest of his watch. As I later thought about this near-mishap, I realized how little attention I had paid to the dangers of high seas and lousy weather during work-ups. At most, I always had thought of the seas as a nuisance. As this incident showed, though, they have the potential of turning one's workplace into a deadly environment. A valuable petty officer was nearly crushed to death. I learned many lessons about how surface combatants operate in an air-warfare environment. These lessons, however, pale in comparison to what I learned about being prepared for anything. Make sure your work center, gym and berthing space is ready for high seas. Look around and secure anything that may become a missile hazard. It'll save you the task of cleaning up later, or more importantly, it may even save a life. Want Reliable Sprinklers? Maintain Them By GMC(SW) Bill Fisher, Naval Safety Center At 0608, a flooding alarm went off in a ship's magazine. A duty petty officer from the weapons department secured firemain pressure to the sprinkler system and hurried to the flooded space. He found 4 inches of water on the deck. Using buckets, swabs and a submersible pump, Sailors dewatered the magazine. What caused the flooding? A ruptured diaphragm had let water leak through a valve. That incident was minor, but another ship wasn't as lucky. When duty personnel responded to a flooding alarm, they found 20 inches of water in a loader room and 2 feet in the magazine below. Electrical and electronic-equipment damage was minor, but mechanical parts (e.g., nuts, bolts and connections) required extensive cleanup to prevent corrosion. I'm not surprised that we receive reports like these. During surveys, I see some magazine-sprinkler systems that are ready to fall off the bulkhead, which tells me that some people don't understand the importance of the systems. We all hope we'll never need the sprinklers for an emergency, but we can't afford to gamble and let them fall into a state of disrepair. All sprinkler PMS and housekeeping duties are important, and three maintenance actions are vital to keeping them in top condition: * Inspect the control-system piping and parts every two weeks1. * Test, clean, inspect, and lubricate the sea-water sprinkler system every two months2. * Flush the supply piping for sea-water sprinklers3. When doing the biweekly inspection of control-system piping and parts, be especially alert for any leaks. If you find any, report them to the damage-control assistant and the weapons officer. The check sheet for the magazine-sprinkler system, found in the sprinkler handbook4, backs up this requirement. The check sheet also lists parts to be inspected, including all the control piping and the sprinkler-control valve. Take care of your magazine sprinklers, or be prepared to pay perhaps millions to repair and replace ordnance. You'll also have the aggravation of submitting a lot of unnecessary paperwork. The author's e-mail address is wfisher@safetycenter.navy.mil. For More Info... 1 MIP 5221/009-79, MRC 2W-1R requires bi-weekly inspection, as well as inspection after the control-system piping and components are used. 2 MRC 2M-1 requires sea-water sprinkler systems to be tested, cleaned, inspected and lubricated bimonthly. 3 MRC R-5Q requires flushing of the supply piping for sea-water sprinklers quarterly when at sea. 4 The Sprinkler Handbook's publication number is S9522-AA-HBK-010. What You Don't Know Can Kill You By GMC(SW) Bill Fisher, Naval Safety Center "Don't mess with that!" barked a BM2 who saw a BMSN raising a Mk-166 launcher. His order came too late, though. The BM2, a BM3 with him, and the BMSN could only watch as both SLQ-49 canisters slid off the launcher, went over the side, and harmlessly deployed. The BMSN had asked the BM2 and BM3 to help him. This mishap's outcome could have been much different. Why? Because each canister contained a nitrogen cylinder pressurized to 4,500 psi. The chain of events leading to this mishap started when the BMSN's supervisor told him to move a spool of line from portside forward to a ship's fantail. "It'll be easier if you first raise the launcher," said the supervisor. "No problem," thought the BMSN. "I've done that before." Even after he realized the launcher was loaded, he didn't hesitate. "So it was unloaded the first time," he rationalized, "how much different can it be to raise the launcher with it loaded?" The BMSN got his answer soon after he and the supervisor were dismissed from an awards ceremony. The BMSN headed back to the launcher where he had left the spool of line. He arrived there ahead of the two shipmates he had asked to help him, and, instead of waiting for them, took matters into his own hands. He had pulled the stow pins and was lifting the launcher when the two helpers arrived on the scene. After reading this account in an explosive mishap report, I had several questions: * Where were the ship's EWs? Why weren't they called to raise the launcher? * Did the maintenance people correctly do PMS on the launcher? According to the BMSN, he pulled only the stow pins--not the release pins. Records showed that PMS had been done two and a half weeks earlier. Did the maintenance people re-install the release pins when they completed the check? * Why was the BMSN operating the launcher? Was he ordnance-certified? Was he PQS-certified on the decoy-launching system? * Where was the BM2 who told the BMSN to raise the launcher in the first place? Why didn't the BM2 call the EWs? One phone call could have prevented this mishap, which cost someone the time and aggravation to file a report, as well as $28,000 to replace the expended decoys. The bright side to this situation is that no one was killed or injured. The author's e-mail address is wfisher@safetycenter.navy.mil. sidebar Second Verse Same As the First By Ken Testorff, Naval Safety Center Ninety days--that's how long it took for an EW2 aboard another class of ship to repeat the mistake the BMSN made in the previous article. The EW2 was placing the starboard-side, Mk-166, Mod 0, SLQ-49 launcher in its down-and-stowed position when it stuck. His solution to this problem was to pull the stow pins from the launching mechanism, which released the SLQ-49. One of the two canisters activated and deployed the inflatable reflector. Failure of the second canister to deploy caused a hazard, so a SAR swimmer attached an activation lanyard to the canister, and ship's force activated it. Both inflatable reflectors were punctured, and all equipment was recovered. Human error was the primary cause of this mishap. The EW2 was PQS-qualified on the launcher, but, after the incident, he admitted he wasn't very familiar with it. The author's e-mail address is ktestorff@safetycenter.navy.mil. Making a Doubting Thomas By MMCM(SW) Tony DeJesus, Naval Hospital, Portsmouth, Va. Follow the procedures, and you won't get hurt. Every junior Sailor hears those words, and, in most cases, they ring true. One Sailor, however, has some doubts. He had to replace a defective O-ring on a valve manifold's hydraulic power pack. Before starting, he isolated the manifold by securing and tagging out the power pack. These actions should have ensured that all hydraulic fluid drained back into the sump. As he started opening the valve above his head, though, a small amount of hydraulic fluid dripped on his cheek. He wiped it off with his hand and kept working until he completed the job. After taking a shower that evening, his right eye felt irritated. He went to medical, where corpsmen flushed his eyes and released him to full duty. According to the mishap report, the Sailor followed the ship's policy and wore a faceshield when he secured the hydraulic power pack. Unfortunately, ship's policy didn't also require him to wear a faceshield while working on a depressurized valve located away from the power pack. Because this mishap resembled one a week earlier, the ship changed its policy and now requires Sailors to wear faceshields for all maintenance involving hydraulic fluid. Even this requirement, however, does not meet the standards outlined in the NavOSH Program Manual for Forces Afloat1. This instruction says that faceshields alone do not protect against flying particles, liquids and sprays. They are secondary protection and must be worn with protective eyewear (goggles). In another case, a Sailor was doing maintenance on an elevator when residual hydraulic fluid splashed in his eyes. He flushed them, then went to medical, where corpsmen treated and released him. This Sailor had worn gloves, an apron, and a faceshield but no chemical goggles. Never take anything for granted. Whenever eye hazards are involved, make sure that the eyewear protection meets the requirements outlined in the NavOSH Program Manual for Forces Afloat. The author was assigned to the Afloat Safety Programs Directorate at the Naval Safety Center when he wrote this article. For More Info... 1 Appendix B5-B of OpNavInst 5100.19C, with change 2, contains guidance for maintenance involving hydraulic fluid. Another reference on the same subject is NSTM, Chapter 575, Hydraulic Equipment, Power Transmission and Control (Revision 2), Section 5, Fluids and Fluid Handling. Alternative to Nagging Fuel Leaks Can Be a Killer By MMC(SW) Philip Anderson, Naval Safety Center On the other side of the world, engineers aboard a Royal Australian Navy (RAN) ship had grown tired of those nagging little fuel leaks you always get with rigid piping. So, they decided to take matters into their own hands. They hired a contractor to replace all the fuel piping on the main diesel engines. The contractor installed flexible hoses made of Teflon and reinforced with a braided, steel-wire exterior. Everything was OK until the ship headed out of a harbor with both main engines operating. Pressure pulses in the engine supply-and-return lines began to stress the flexible hoses. Soon, a hose supplying fuel to the port main engine ruptured, spraying fuel into the space. Watchstanders quickly secured this engine and isolated the leak. Unknown to them, however, a hose on the starboard main engine also had ruptured. The fuel spray from the starboard engine soon burst into flames and created every engineer's nightmare--a fuel fire in the main-machinery space. The fire quickly grew out of control, and the space filled with heat and smoke, forcing watchstanders to evacuate. It took firefighters three hours to extinguish the inferno, which killed four people. (For complete details, see "A Tough Decision" in July-September 1999 issue.) What went wrong? The Teflon hoses used to replace the fuel piping were not designed to withstand the pressure pulses that occur in the supply-and-return lines of engines. The constant stress of the pressure pulses caused the hoses to weaken and eventually fail. How could this happen? Ship's force hadn't submitted an alteration request to change the hard piping to flexible hoses on the diesel engines. Without RAN approval, the alteration was unauthorized. To make matters worse, the hoses used by the contractor were not RAN-approved, and ship's force didn't check the hoses before the contractor installed them. After reading about this disaster, I did some research and learned there have been many recent changes to the application, life cycle and criticality of flexible hoses in the U.S. Navy. It's important that we understand the new requirements so we don't repeat the mistakes that led to the deaths of those four Australian sailors. Teflon flexible hoses (like the ones the contractor used aboard the RAN ship) are authorized for steam drains (below 380 degrees). They also are OK to use for compressed air (low and high pressure up to 350 degrees), nitrogen (low and high pressure up to 350 degrees), and oxygen (permitted only for charging purposes from pier to ship). The benefit of using Teflon flexible hoses is that service conditions usually won't degrade them, which ensures unlimited service life. Consider Teflon hoses as replacements for critical rubber hoses reaching the end of their service life or failing inspection. Once in place, Teflon hoses only require replacement if they fail periodic inspection. The life cycle of flexible rubber hoses involves two elements: shelf life and service life. The shelf life is from the date of manufacture (which should be marked on the hose) to installation. The basic shelf life is six years. If the hoses are stored properly, their shelf life can be extended four years, at two-year intervals, provided they pass the required tests1. The service life of rubber hoses starts when we install them. The length of service life is determined by the criticality of the system or application in which we use them. Rubber hoses in critical systems and applications have a maximum service life of 12 years, at which time we must replace them. Hoses placed in non-critical applications have no limits to service life. Flexible rubber hoses (critical or non-critical) that are used in vacuum service and that are immersed in water have a maximum service life of six years. All flexible hoses require periodic inspection2. Immediately replace any hoses that fail inspection or show signs of leakage. Flexible hoses are critical if we use them in any of these systems or applications: * mission essential, where failure would jeopardize a ship's mission * ship safety, where failure would affect a ship's safety systems * hazardous fluid, where failure would release a system fluid that injures people or damages equipment * hazardous pressure, where systems have design pressure greater than 1,000 psi for gas or 500 psi for fluid * collateral damage, where failure of a hose would cause damage to equipment * repair capability, where ship's force is not capable of repairing a hose assembly at sea. All other flexible hoses are considered non-critical. Each ship must submit a list of critical and non-critical hoses to Naval Sea Systems Command for approval. Until the list is approved, the maximum service life of flexible rubber hoses is 12 years. Ship's force must ensure flexible hoses are used in the proper applications, even when outside activities do the repairs. Determining criticality and understanding the system requirements are important steps to getting the right flexible hoses in the right systems. The consequences of a mistake can be a disaster like the one that occurred aboard the RAN ship. The author's e-mail address is panderson@safetycenter.navy.mil. For More Info... 1 Naval Sea Systems Command Technical Directive S6430-AE-TED-010 (Piping Devices, Flexible-Hose Assemblies) outlines the tests that flexible rubber hoses must pass before their shelf life can be extended. 2 S6430-AE-TED-010 also details the inspection schedule for all flexible rubber hoses. A Mistaken Sense of Security By MMC(SW) Philip Anderson Naval Safety Center "Cool to the touch"--that's how a petty officer described a steam valve before he and a shipmate started repairing it. They had been told to repack the valve, which was in the upper level of a ship's engineroom. With the tagout complete, the petty officer decided to get a head start on the job. The problem with his plan was that it didn't include using the low-pressure drains to bleed pressure from the system, then waiting for the pressure to drop. The valve felt cool, so he began removing its bolts. After taking out only two bolts, the petty officer left the engineroom. During his absence, the shipmate arrived. He saw what the petty officer had done and assumed the seal on the valve had been broken and the residual steam pressure had been bled from the system. He removed the last two bolts and also left. The petty officer soon returned, saw that all the bolts were out, and started trying to dislodge the valve. When it broke free, scalding water sprayed on his face, shoulder and back, causing second-degree burns. This mishap was the result of miscommunication and a failure to use good engineering practices. To prevent recurrences, follow these guidelines1: * Isolate the piping system or component you're working on, and use two-barrier tagout protection. Hang tags to prevent someone from opening the system or component locally or from a remote location. * Depressurize and drain the isolated portion of the system, then allow enough time for the system to cool before starting maintenance. You also should tag low-pressure drain valves open and check them for residual pressure. * Slowly and evenly loosen fasteners until the pressure seal on a valve breaks to prevent the system from venting uncontrolled steam and hot water. * When doing repairs with shipmates, keep one another briefed on the status of the job. Don't assume what work has been done or what procedure is next. If you have a question, talk to your supervisor. * Have accurate, written work procedures available before starting maintenance or repairs. * Supervisors should check tagouts for accuracy before letting people do maintenance or repairs on high-temperature, pressurized systems. Make sure work areas are checked for hazards. Review precautions and work procedures. The author's e-mail address is panderson@safetycenter.navy.mil. For More Info... 1 Complete guidance for working on steam valves can be found in the NavOSH Program Manual for Forces Afloat (OpNavInst 5100.19C, with change 2), Chapter 13 (Piping Systems); NSTM, Chapter 505, Piping Systems, Sections 1 and 8; and Joint Fleet Maintenance Manual (CinCLantFltInst/CinCPacFltInst 4790.3), Vol. 5, Part I, Chapter 1, and Part II, Chapter 3. Two Dips and I'm Outta Here By DCC(SW) Richard Robinson, USN(Ret.) It was one of the coldest February days I could remember when three shipmates (an HT1, HT2 and HTFN) and I started replacing some exterior fittings aboard an LPD. While the HT1 and HTFN went to the ship to remove the old fittings and prepare the working area, the HT2 and I stayed in the shipfitter shop and made the new fittings. Around noon, we all met at the ship. The wind was howling, and three-fourths of the harbor was covered with ice as we got ready to go to work. We had to weld the new fittings on the starboard side of the ship, about 15 feet off the water. With heating strips placed around the weld area, we rigged the fittings into position. The top and bottom edge of each fitting required welding. Doing the top edge would be no problem. To weld the bottom edge and seam, though, someone would have to go over the side, and that task wouldn't be easy. Because of the miserable weather, each of us was wearing at least five layers of clothing. We looked like a clan of Stay-Puf marshmallow men. The HT1 had a simple idea how to reach the bottom edge. One of us would don a safety harness, then get on a scaffolding and be lowered over the side with a welding lead in our hand. Once the line on the scaffolding was tied off, the welding would begin. I wasn't afraid of heights or water, so I volunteered to go over the side. It was 1300 but still brutally cold as I tested the welder, set all the controls where I wanted them, and adjusted the safety harness. Bending over to grab the deck combing, I lowered myself to the scaffolding. Then, I jumped a couple of times to make sure it would hold me, and when the HT1 had secured the line, I was ready--or, so I thought. Grabbing some slack welding lead in one hand, I pulled on the line. Suddenly, the knot came loose, and I found myself treading water. My clothes already were freezing by the time my shipmates got me back on deck. The HT1 told the HT2 to take me to the barracks so I could change and to bring me back to complete the job. When we returned, I was wearing even more layers of clothing than I had on the first time. Immediately, I got on the scaffolding and was lowered into position, then yelled for the HT1 to tie me off. When he hollered that the scaffolding was secure, I asked, "Are you sure?" With his affirmative reply, I again gathered up some slack welding lead and gave a light pull on the scaffolding line. When nothing happened, I got into position to start welding. I soon realized I needed more slack welding lead, so I asked for it. "OK, you have it," said the HT1, as he gave me about 12 more inches. He barely had finished his statement when a gust of wind hit me, causing me to lose my balance. About the same time, the knot in the scaffolding came loose again, and I took my second dip. This trip to the icy water was all the fun I could stand for one day. I was numb by the time I got back on deck, so I headed for the warmth of the barracks and stayed there while my shipmates finished the job. The author was assigned to the Afloat Safety Programs Directorate at the Naval Safety Center when he wrote this article. The incident he describes took place in 1980. He had been in the Navy two years and was assigned to SIMA Little Creek. An Eye Full of Hazmat, But Nowhere To Go By HMCS(SW) Richard Bulgin, Naval Safety Center A seaman is mixing paint in the paint-issue room when the ship takes an unexpected roll. As he steadies himself, he turns around just in time to see an open can of paint thinner defy the law of gravity. He throws up his hands, but mist nevertheless hits him in the face. He bolts for an eyewash station in the space but can't reach it because boxes and paint cans are stacked in front of it. A shipmate finds and escorts him to medical, where he is treated and returned to duty. * * * While a PO3 is moving a large can containing a corrosive from an upper shelf to a lower one, the lid comes off, and the corrosive empties on his head. Immediately, his eyes and face start burning, and sheer panic, like he's never known before, sets in. Knowing an eyewash station is mounted on the starboard bulkhead of the next compartment, he dashes for the watertight door while screaming like a banshee. Because his vision is clouded, he trips on the door and falls headlong into a rack of compressed-gas cylinders in the next compartment. Shipmates eventually find him semi-conscious and bleeding profusely from cuts on his face and mouth and take him to sick bay. A corpsman sees an opaque film forming over the PO3's eyes, a sign of possible severe tissue damage, and calls for an immediate medevac. Days later, while lying in a hospital bed, the PO3 asks himself, "Why me?" He begins to dissect the whole stupid situation and how he almost blinded himself. He remembers some things he and his LPO had heard during the ship's latest safety survey. "You have unsealed containers of hazmat, and the emergency eyewash is blocked," the surveyor had said. "The eyewash station meets the distance requirement of no more than 10 seconds to reach, and it's no more than 100 feet from the hazard," the surveyor continued, "but all units must be available in easily accessible, unobstructed locations." The PO3 immediately thinks about the watertight door. He also remembers the surveyor touting the virtues of a process in which you identify the hazards associated with a task, assess the hazards, consider possible controls, implement controls, then decide on and supervise a plan of action. "The process applies to even the simplest of jobs," the surveyor had said. "It's called operational risk management, or, as most people prefer, ORM." The PO3 thinks to himself, "Moving cans of hazmat is about as simple as you can get, but look at what happened to me. When I get better, I'm gonna look into this ORM business a little further, while I still have both eyes." Author's Note: These accounts are based on facts. Simple things can become extremely complex in a matter of seconds. From January 1998 to October 1999, I counted 68 cases of obstructed eyewash stations during shipboard safety surveys. Add in the many cases I also found where people used the wrong type of PPE or none at all and had poor housekeeping habits, and the stage is set for disaster--one that easily can be avoided with a little ORM. Don't let the world of living color you enjoy today become a world of total darkness tomorrow. The author's e-mail address is rbulgin@safetycenter.navy.mil. Is Your Galley a Breeding Place for Illness? By HMCS(SW) Richard Bulgin, Naval Safety Center If chow time is one of your favorite parts of the day, you may not want to read any further. Why? Because a lot more is happening in some of your shipboard galleys than meets the eye. Here is a list of things I've seen during safety surveys: * food-service workers sniffling and rubbing their noses while tossing salads * no paper towels or soap in the heads that galley workers use * food that has been refrigerated or heated inadequately * improperly cleaned utensils on serving lines * meat slicers that haven't been cleaned for a long time * people sampling food with their bare hands--with supervisors watching. I even saw an MS3, with open sores on his hands, preparing meatballs (yep, you guessed it--without wearing gloves). So, what does food-service sanitation have to do with safety? For openers, your health depends on it. Foods of animal origin (such as meat, eggs and milk) most often provide the means for transmitting food-borne illnesses. These foods have common characteristics: They provide moisture, a good supply of protein, and warmth. Given enough time, these factors promote an ideal environment for bacteria to grow. It's important to remember that these organisms do not necessarily cause food to change appearance, odor or taste. Food-borne illnesses can affect one person, or they can incapacitate large numbers in a short period of time. More than half of all reported outbreaks of food-borne illnesses are the result of gross carelessness or deficiencies in food-service sanitation (e.g., food prepared too long before serving, poor refrigeration, poor personal hygiene). Food-borne illnesses are divided into two types: intoxication and infection. Food-Borne Intoxication. Certain bacteria under favorable conditions produce chemicals (toxins) in food, which, when eaten, will make you ill. The toxins produced by these bacteria are heat stable (e.g., not destroyed by normal cooking temperatures). The illness is characterized by an abrupt onset (two to four hours after ingestion) of severe nausea, projectile vomiting (the kind that's powerful enough to hit your buddy at five paces), diarrhea, and complete physical exhaustion. Foods commonly associated with this type of illness are canned or potted meat and fish, beef, cheese, cream or custard-filled pastries, and potato or pasta salads. The usual source of the bacteria involved may be the nose, throat, boils, pimples, or infected cuts on the hands of food-service workers. Food-Borne Infection. This type of illness is caused by eating food with a bacteria that must multiply in the digestive tract before it produces the toxins that cause the symptoms. Many organisms can cause food-borne infections. Symptoms usually develop within 24 hours and may include fever, headache, nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, and total exhaustion. How do you avoid these illnesses? By setting a high standard of sanitation, personal hygiene, and training, then closely supervising all your food-service workers. Otherwise, you risk the well-being of shipmates, which could affect the ability of a ship to complete its mission. The author's e-mail address is rbulgin@safetycenter.navy.mil. Editor's Note The first time I reviewed this story, it reminded me of a tale I've heard my dad tell many times. The setting was nighttime at an Army camp somewhere overseas during World War II. Dad and some fellow soldiers were in the mess tent preparing biscuits for breakfast the next morning. As they were rolling out the dough, little black flecks started appearing in it. Peering through a haze toward the dim lights overhead, Dad and his buddies soon saw the source of their problem. Hordes of gnats were buzzing around the lights, and some were getting zapped, then falling into the dough. When Dad and the others complained to the mess sergeant, he simply hollered, "Aw, shut up, and get back to work! They'll just think they're eating cracked wheat." Thanks for a great story, Pop. A Whistle Away From Death By MMCS(SS) Terry Fahringer, Naval Safety Center As I headed topside for sea-and-anchor detail, I ran through the list of checks for the Kapok life vest I was wearing. Collar ties tied, check. Chest ties tied, check. Waist ties tied, check. Crotch straps attached to rings and tightened, check. Waist strap attached to rings and tightened, check. I really thought I was set to handle lines, but as I soon would learn, I had overlooked a small but important detail. Our submarine was leaving port with the help of tugs until we lined up in the channel. The tugs pulled us away from the pier and out into the channel where line handlers cast off the after tug. Meanwhile, the forward tug jockeyed our ship into position for a straight shot out of the channel. When ordered to cast off the line attached to the forward tug, personnel aboard the tug eased the strain on the line, and I removed it from the cleat. I then grabbed the heaving line attached to the tug's head line so I could tend it and keep it from going into the water between the tug and the side of our boat. A shipmate grabbed the heaving line behind me to help tend it as tug personnel started pulling it aboard. Suddenly, my whistle lanyard flipped up, wrapped around the heaving line, and, before I knew it, I was being pulled toward the tug. Because there were no safety lines, I had nothing to grab. (Safety lines and stanchions aboard a submarine leaving port are removed in preparation for diving the boat.) I had only one choice: I started yelling for tug personnel to stop pulling as I struggled to free myself. I was at the point of no return, watching the tug surging in the swells against the side of the ship, when a shipmate realized what was happening. He grabbed me from behind and pulled me to safety. A split second later, the tug personnel felt the added resistance and stopped pulling the line, which allowed me to free myself. This incident lasted only seconds, but it made a lasting impression on me. As a result of seeing my life flash before my eyes that day, I always make sure I tuck my whistle inside my life vest. I also go around and make sure my shipmates tuck in their whistles. Some of them look at me a little strangely, wondering why I harp on such a small detail, but I can stand their looks because I know what can happen in the blink of an eye. The author was a PO2 when this near-mishap occurred. His e-mail address is tfahringer@safetycenter.navy.mil. Trapped on the Ocean Floor By Doris Ryan, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, and HMCS(SS) Brett Darnell, Naval Safety Center A CO gives the order to dive, and a submarine slips beneath the waves. At 40 feet, this routine event is interrupted by a frantic cry over the intercom. "Flooding in the engineroom! Flooding..." The voice ends with a reluctant click as the system goes dead. The diving officer immediately orders, "Blow all main ballast, shut all watertight doors." The descent stops momentarily but soon resumes at an agonizingly slow pace. At 242 feet, the submarine hits bottom with a shudder. Investigation by the ship's officers and men reveals the main induction valve apparently was open during the dive. The flooding is so bad that no effort by the crew alone can take the submarine to the surface. Their only hope is to release a messenger buoy, settle back, and wait for someone to rescue them. Ashore, an alarm sounds when the submarine's surfacing signal is overdue. A sister ship gets underway to search the diving area. As the sister ship sweeps through the last known position of the missing submarine, a lookout spots the messenger buoy. Communications are established with sound-powered phones, and before long, rescue efforts are in progress. Twenty-eight hours later, survivors in the sunken submarine's forward torpedo room are rescued. In another 12 hours, the last of 29 survivors reach safety. Twenty-nine other crewmen are trapped in after compartments, which flooded first, and there is no hope for survival. Perhaps you're saying this account of the May 23, 1939 tragedy aboard USS Squalus (SS 192) can't be repeated today. What if you're mistaken, though? Would you know what to do if your submarine became disabled somewhere on the ocean floor, and you were the senior surviving crew member? Thanks to scientists at the Naval Submarine Medical Research Laboratory (NSMRL), you will have some help making decisions if that crisis ever arises. The staff at NSMRL calls it the submarine escape and rescue expert, or SEAREX. It runs on an extra rugged, waterproof, notebook computer. The software is an interactive task-management program that will help you manage the complex and unfamiliar environment of a disabled submarine. The software presents a list of tasks, displayed as icons arranged in order of urgency and importance, using a traffic-light, color-coding system. Overdue tasks are colored red, current tasks are yellow, and pending tasks are green. The software asks you for data. Then, based on your inputs, the program recommends when to start an escape to ensure all survivors don't exceed safe limits of exposure to atmospheric contaminants. You can take tasks out of sequence or postpone them if things get too busy. Other software routines include managing toxic gases, preparing the escape trunk, and rationing food and water. The program also gives you the data to help you weigh the risk of decompression sickness (DCS). It balances your risk of DCS while trying to escape from a submarine in shallow water against the risks of heat or cold exposure and toxic gas build-up by staying in the submarine and waiting to be rescued. The program autosaves every five minutes so you can rapidly restore your data should the computer crash. Members of the submarine community have tested the program, and their recommendations are incorporated in the software design. "Since modern submarines are built and operated to such high standards of safety, the probability of one sinking is extremely low," explains Douglas Wray, a senior biomedical engineer at NSMRL and head of the SEAREX effort. "Our first hope is that this work will never have to be put to use. But in the unlikely event of an actual disabled submarine, this research could mean the difference between the life or death of the crew." NSMRL has been a major contributor to integrating leading-edge technologies into the operations of submarine crews. The SEAREX format may apply to other complex management programs, such as damage control. It also has potential as a teaching platform. For more information on research efforts at NSMRL, visit their web site at http://www.nhrc.navy.mil/nsmrl/. Senior Chief Darnell's e-mail address is bdarnell@safetycenter. navy.mil. [SEAREX is not operational yet in the submarine fleet. The goal of people at NavSea is to deploy it in FY01 aboard SSN 688-class submarines. Other submarine classes are scheduled to follow at one-to-two-year intervals.--Ed.] ORM Corner It's Toolman Time! By Lt. Tom Binner, Naval Safety Center Just 10 seconds--that's all the time it would have taken a PO2 to do a little risk assessment. Instead, he rushed into a job and ended up slicing a nerve in his right palm. He spent 14 days on convalescent leave before a doctor re-evaluated his injury and scheduled him for surgery, which led to six months of limited duty. He never returned to his command. The PO2's problem started when he decided to use one of the knife blades on a multi-purpose tool to remove a plastic tie from the leg of a desk. The blade sliced his palm, and he had to go to a naval hospital for treatment. As outlined in the mishap report, he should have used a pair of wire cutters or snips for the job. Painful injuries like this remain common aboard some ships. Elsewhere, Sailors are learning the purpose and benefits of using operational risk management (ORM). Here's a random sampling of some fleet comments I've read during the last two months: USS Moosbrugger (DD 980) - "We have had no mishaps since implementing ORM." USS Gonzales (DDG 66) - "Because of our in-depth risk assessments before boat operations, we have been able to reschedule them when heavy weather isn't a factor without sacrificing mission accomplishment." USS Sides (FFG 14) - "ORM puts you in the right frame of mind; it helps you ask the right questions--the 'what ifs.'" USS The Sullivans (DDG 68) - "Using ORM has helped us accomplish small-boat ops in heavy seas and after dark without incident." USS Yorktown (CG 48) - "Since we received ORM training, we assess the risks of all shipboard drills. We have operated mishap-free since we had the training." We want to hear how ORM is changing the way you do business. That's why we ask these questions on all of our customer satisfaction surveys: * Has your SOP changed as a result of ORM training? * Are officers, CPOs, LPOs, and the crew asking questions about risk? * Was the time spent on ORM training worth it? * What accomplishments or success stories do you have as a result of ORM? Share your stories with us, so we can pass them along to the fleet in future issues of Fathom. Sound off and be counted for ORM. It's not a program; it's a way of life. The author's e-mail address is tbinner@safetycenter.navy.mil. Attaboy! McClusky Engineers Fight As They Train By Ens. Chad Graham and Ens. Jaja Marshall, USS McClusky (FFG 41) It was just another hot, sunny day in the Northern Arabian Gulf until we heard these heart-stopping words come over the 1MC, "Engineering casualty, engineering casualty, major lube-oil leak in the main engineroom. ASM, PSM, sounding and security, lay to the main engineroom." General quarters rang throughout the ship. In less than five minutes, all repair lockers reported manned and ready. What made this kind of response possible? The engineering and damage-control training we hold aboard McClusky. The engineering-training team, made up of only senior personnel, is responsible for training all engineering watchstanders in every aspect of engineering-casualty control. With the help of the damage-control-training team, also composed of senior personnel, members train these watchstanders and the repair parties how to combat various main-space emergencies. The two teams collectively evaluate each drill. As the training cycle progresses, the crew becomes more proficient. "It requires a lot of time and hard work, but seeing the ship do well makes this training worthwhile," said a PO1. As McClusky approaches its mid-cycle assessments, the engineering and damage-control training teams continue to hone their skills. The crew is prepared to face any challenge that comes their way. In fact, they've already passed the most important test of all: a real-life mishap. They corrected the plant casualty in less than two hours, with no injuries to the crew and zero damage to the ship. Ships' Safety Bulletin January-March 2000 Watch That Gas Build Up Sailors were staging a 55-gallon drum for transfer by helo to a supply ship when the lid blew off and flew 50 feet across a flight deck. Luckily, there were no injuries, and no equipment was damaged. The cause of this incident was hydrogen-gas build up inside the drum. Packing and shipping all types of batteries are strictly controlled processes. Follow the procedures in section 2.8 of NSTM 313 (Portable Storage and Dry Batteries) for packaging and containerizing wet-cell batteries. Use Appendix L of the Environmental and Natural Resources Program Manual (OpNavInst 5090.1B), with change 2, dated 9 September 1999, for disposal guidance. OpNavInst 5090.1B, with change 2, takes precedence over all other Navy directives and manuals for disposal of hazardous material. When packaging wet-cell batteries for shipment while underway, use an 18-gauge steel, 55-gallon drum (NSN 8110-00-823-8121). Put a used hazmat form (OpNav 5100/18) on the side of the drum, with the special instructions necessary to avoid an incident like the one mentioned earlier. If you're on the receiving end of containerized wet-cell batteries marked for disposal, you must vent the container periodically to prevent any gas build up. Remember that expended batteries still may produce hydrogen gas. NavSafeCen Point of Contact: Lt. T. Binner (Code 31) (757) 444-3520, Ext. 7112 (DSN 564) e-mail: tbinner@safetycenter.navy.mil Is Your Galley Griddle Electrically Safe? More and more fleet Sailors are finding out what it feels like to be shocked by 450 volts of alternating current while removing and cleaning grease traps on griddles. All this pain could be avoided if everyone would tag out the equipment first. If your griddle was made with exposed wires above the drip pan, the PMS inspection interval is monthly. If your griddle was made with encased wires above the drip pan, the PMS inspection interval is semi-annual. We recommend you consult the manufacturer's technical manual to determine which type of application you have. MIP series 6532, dated July 1999, covers electric ranges and griddles. For your protection, we recommend you follow these tips: * Inspect galley grease traps on electric griddles for exposed wiring. * Ensure PMS is done at the required intervals. * Tag out griddles when cleaning the grease-trap area. This should be part of the standard operating procedures. Food-warming trays on galley serving lines also continue to be a problem. When you maintain or replace the heating elements of these units, make sure you replace the sheet-metal-cover panel on the bottom. This cover panel prevents contact with the wiring harness and control elements of food-warming trays. We recommend you periodically inspect and do maintenance on these trays to protect people from this 115-volt shock hazard. NavSafeCen Point of Contact: EMCS(SW) K. Churchman (Code 341E) (757) 444-3520, Ext. 7110 (DSN 564) e-mail: kchurchman@safetycenter.navy.mil What's Wrong With the Other Half? Of the more than 30 ships I have surveyed in the past year, only about half met the spill-contingency requirements of OpNavInst 5100.19C and OpNavInst 5090.1B. Here are some of the discrepancies I find: * The ship doesn't have a plan. * The ship has a plan, but no one knows who is responsible for maintaining it. * The ship has a plan, but no one knows where it is. * The ship has a plan, but it's not up to date. * The plan only lists the Navy on-scene commander (NOSC) for the ship's home port, instead of all the areas where the ship usually operates or deploys. If you need help preparing a complete plan, refer to OpNavInst 5100.19C, with change 2, Appendix B3-A, and OpNavInst 5090.1B, with change 2, sections 19-9.2.4, 19-9.2.10, and 19-14.10 M. NavSafeCen Point of Contact: Lt. T. Binner (Code 31) (757) 444-3520, Ext. 7112 (DSN 564) e-mail: tbinner@safetycenter.navy.mil SPRU Is for You, Too! Before you get too comfortable with your shore-power stations and their related cable runs, take a look at this top 10 list of common deficiencies we find during safety surveys: * Pilot lights don't work. * Shore-power-receptacle-access-cover interlock is out of commission. * Cables are overloaded. * Camlock connectors are lying on the deck in water. * Personnel are walking on energized cables. * Cables aren't long enough to support tidal changes. * Personnel aren't doing insulation-resistance checks on shore-power-receptacle terminals. * Shunt-trip coil on shore-power breaker is out of commission. * Personnel aren't doing phase-rotation and orientation checks on each shore-power cable. * Shore-power stations aren't roped off, and "Danger High Voltage" signs aren't in place. The weight of the cables, test procedures, working-party supervision, public works interface, and length of cable runs provide a challenge for everyone rigging and unrigging shore power. The EOSS procedure for shore power rigging and unrigging (SPRU) is an invaluable tool; however, it doesn't tell you how many people are required to heave a shore-power cable. Operational risk management (ORM) can answer what seems to be obvious when planning to rig and unrig shore-power cables. Each time you rig or unrig these cables, use SPRU exactly as it's written and make sure you have the applicable MRCs. It's equally important for supervisors to identify the hazards, assess them, and implement control measures to ensure everyone's safety. Otherwise, you could end up submitting a mishap report. NavSafeCen Point of Contact: EMCS(SW) K. Churchman (Code 341E) (757) 444-3520, Ext. 7110 (DSN 564) e-mail: kchurchman@safetycenter.navy.mil Flangehead Sez: What Part of Highly Flammable Don't You Understand? When I was a young fireman, I had to paint the main-engine turbines. After grabbing my unlabeled coffee can full of highly flammable, oil-based, white paint, I went to work--completing two sides of the fire triangle. The air supplied the oxygen, and the paint vapors supplied the fuel. All I needed was a little heat to complete the equation. As I neared the top half of the high-pressure (HP) turbine, I put my paintbrush near the nozzle block. That's where the 1,200-psi, 900-degree-F, main steam enters the turbine. Suddenly, I heard a "whoof," and part of the turbine lagging, along with my paintbrush, burst into flames. My heart raced as the fire grew. I frantically began huffing and puffing, trying to blow out the flames on my paintbrush. At the same time, I tried to smother the flames on the lagging with a rag. It took several seconds, but I was able to extinguish the small blaze before it got out of control. "So, what makes a substance highly flammable?" you ask. Category I flammables and combustibles include material with a flashpoint below 200 degrees F and all aerosols. Flashpoint--what's that? The flashpoint is the lowest temperature at which a flammable substance gives off enough vapor to form an ignitable mixture with the air around it. When you get this ignitable mixture close enough to something hot, such as steam piping, or the main-engine nozzle block, the vapor will flash into flame. The fire point is the temperature at which sufficient vapors are present above the surface of the substance to sustain combustion upon ignition. As you can see, I learned this lesson the hard way. Here are some examples of improperly stowed highly flammable items I routinely find in machinery rooms during safety surveys: Never-Dull. This metal polish material gives off flammable vapors and presents an explosion hazard. Aerosol cans (spray paint, lubricating oils, and cleaners). These spray cans are pressurized, and the contents are highly flammable. When exposed to high heat, the cans will explode. All aerosols are category I flammables, regardless of the contents, and must be kept away from heat sources such as steam lines, electrical panels, and exhaust systems at all times. Paint and primer. I find paint and primer in all areas of machinery spaces. I also find paint in various types of improper, unlabeled containers, such as coffee cans or cut-off soda cans. It's OK to use some highly flammable (category I) materials in machinery spaces. Items such as paint, metal polish and penetrating oil can be checked out from hazmat-issue rooms for daily maintenance or repair, but they must be returned by the end of the day. Stowage of highly flammable material in the machinery room is strictly prohibited, even in hazmat lockers located in the machinery space (according to NSTM 670, Stowage, Handling and Disposal of Hazardous General Use Consumables, Section 4, and OpNavInst 5100.19C, Chapters C23 and D). The temperatures in many machinery rooms can climb over 100 degrees F. Some of the equipment and systems operate at considerably higher temperatures. Accordingly, you must be careful when using highly flammable materials in machinery rooms. These materials should not be left unattended in lockers or angle irons. Never place them close to a heat source. Take it from this flangehead, if you find highly flammable materials not in use, get them out of your space and back where they belong. NavSafeCen Point of Contact: MMC(SW) P. Anderson (Code 341M) (757) 444-3520, Ext. 7105 (DSN 564) e-mail: panderson@safetycenter.navy.mil Photoluminescent Labels Assigned NSNs There's good news for anyone looking for 3M shipboard photoluminescent/retro-reflective labels. They're available from the Defense Industrial Supply Center Philadelphia (DSCP). Working with 3M, officials at DSCP have negotiated a long-term agreement to provide these products. A national stock number (NSN) has been assigned to each label. The objective is to provide lower prices, customer satisfaction, multiple ordering methods, and faster delivery, direct from the contractor. If you would like a catalog that lists the new NSNs, or if you have questions, contact Herman Myers at (215) 737-4533 (DSN 444), e-mail: hmyers@dscp.dla.mil. Another point of contact is Mary Jane Angelopoulos at (215) 737-4418 (DSN 444), e-mail: mangelopoulos@dscp.dla.mil. You also can order catalogs (paper or CD-ROM) from Chick Opel at 3M traffic control, (800) 686-9207, e-mail: copel@mmm.com. NavSafeCen Point of Contact: DCC(SW) R. Wright (Code 342A) (757) 444-3520, Ext. 7117 (DSN 564) e-mail: rwright@safetycenter.navy.mil Shelf Life of M-291 Kits Extended The shelf life of M-291 kits made by Rohm and Haas Company before 1992 has been extended to 10 years from the manufacturing date. These kits, which can be identified by the letters "RHA" in the first three positions of the lot number, will now begin to expire on Jan. 31, 2001. Kits manufactured by Pine Bluff Arsenal still have the five-year shelf-life period. Once these kits get close to expiring, testing will be done to determine whether or not the shelf life can be extended. If you require new M-291 kits, order them, using NSN 6850-01-276-1905. The unit of issue is BX (box of 20 kits) for $250. For more information on this topic, refer to NavSurfWarCen ShipSysEngSta Philadelphia, PA message DTG R171800Z Jun 99. This message is available from your ISIC or the Naval Safety Center point of contact. NavSurfWarCen Point of Contact: V. Bagnell (Code 621) (215) 897-1286 (DSN 443) e-mail: bagnellva@nswccd.navy.mil NavSafeCen Point of Contact: DCC(SW) R. Wright (Code 342A) (757) 444-3520, Ext. 7119 (DSN 564) e-mail: rwright@safetycenter.navy.mil Putting the Coverall Confusion To Rest Can these coveralls be used in fire and main-machinery rooms? Do they replace the fire-retardant coveralls? Those are some of the questions we're hearing about the newly authorized, blue, cotton coveralls, which you can purchase at the Navy Exchange. These new coveralls are not fire-retardant, and they are not authorized for wear in fire or main-machinery rooms. For more guidance on what clothing is authorized while lighting boilers or standing watches in fire and main-machinery rooms, refer to NSTM 221 (Boilers, Advance Change Notice 3/A), note 221-4.1, and OpNavInst 5100.19C (NavOSH Program Manual for Forces Afloat), with change 2, paragraphs B1201 through B1204. To find stock numbers and the various sizes of fire-retardant coveralls available, refer to the Allowance Equipage List 2-80044201, which lists 17 different sizes. The Naval Clothing and Textile Research Facility provided this name and ordering information for the only authorized commercial vendor you can use if the coveralls aren't available through the supply system: Company: Red Cap Industries Style No: CCH2NV Sizes/Cost: S-XL, $39.75 XXL and XXXL, $47.70 Phone: (800) 733-5271 Fax: (800) 877-8329 Point of Contact: Kim Cothron e-mail: cothrok@vfc.com NavSafeCen Point of Contact: DCC(SW) R. Wright (Code 342A) (757) 444-3520, Ext. 7119 (DSN 564) e-mail: rwright@safetycenter.navy.mil Do You Have a Handle on It? A Sailor stands under a hatch watching a compressed-gas cylinder being lifted. The rigging lets go, and the bottle drops and breaks his foot. Another Sailor injures his back while moving gas bottles from a flight deck to stowage racks. For these shipmates and others who may not know it, there's such a thing as a gas-cylinder-handling bag. It's adjustable to cylinder sizes from 9 to 14 inches in diameter and is designed to lift gas bottles and flasks horizontally or vertically. Carrying straps allow up to four people to handle a cylinder, and there's a single lift point for hoist or crane operations. The bag resists acids, chemicals, saltwater corrosion, mold, and mildew, and it floats in the water. Although the 350-pound-capacity bags aren't available through the supply system, an IMA with the proper equipment can make them for you. NavSea Drawing No. 803-5959260 gives specific instructions on how to make them. One possible supplier is Custom Containers LLC, Rt. 28, P.O. Box 399, Springfield, WV 26763, phone (877) 549-9466, fax (304) 492-5219, e-mail thedolphingrp@citlink.net. The prices are $995 each if you order one or two bags, $895 if you order three or four, and $795 if you order five or more. They come in red and tan while supplies last. Most ships now have PMS coverage on the gas-cylinder-handling bags. The MRC was included in FR 2-99 released in April 1999. It includes an inspection of the bag before and after each use. The MRC appears on MIP 5736/001-49. The MRC is a situational requirement (R-3) and states that personnel should inspect the straps and hoisting loop for tears, frayed threads, broken stitches, cuts, burns, acid damage, abrasions, punctures, snags, and tensile breaks. Also inspect the bag for worn areas, tears, cuts, and broken stitches. Other requirements are to inspect the buckles for deformation or cracks and ensure they fasten securely. For more information on the long-standing problem of dropped gas bottles and procurement of the handling bags, refer to NavSea letter 9572 Ser 03W2/20 dated 27 Jun 1997, which was distributed to surface, air and submarine type commands. NavSafeCen Points of Contact: MMCS(SS) T. Fahringer (Code 382E) (757) 444-3520, Ext. 7095 (DSN 564) e-mail: tfahringer@safetycenter.navy.mil DCC(SW) R. Wright (Code 342A) (757) 444-3520, Ext. 7119 (DSN 564) e-mail: rwright@safetycenter.navy.mil Making PPE Readily Available to All Hands Wander through any shipboard working space and you'll likely find people not using personal protective equipment (PPE). Their excuses vary as much as the jobs they're doing, but it all comes down to access. People simply won't use safety equipment unless it's readily available when they need it. Many commands make safety equipment a standard part of checking out equipment and tools. PPE is also an integral part of maintenance, and every MRC lists required PPE. But what about those times you didn't plan a tour of the main spaces where double hearing protection is required, or you didn't realize someone was grinding in an area you needed to pass through. What did you do then? Shipmates aboard USS Oldendorf (DD 972) have found a solution to this problem. They call it a "Safety Mart." Commonly used PPE (does not include items requiring strict control, such as respirators and electrical gloves) is placed in a cabinet installed just outside the messdecks on the beverage line--the area of the ship with the most traffic. Modification and installation were simple. The Safety Mart consists of a built-in cabinet with shelves for goggles, eye shields, foam hearing protection, circumaural muffs ("Mickey Mouse" ears), and gloves for use by all hands. This innovation does not excuse crew members or work centers from ordering and maintaining their own PPE. But it does make life much more simple for the average worker who "doesn't have time" to put safety first. NavSafeCen Point of Contact: Lt. L. Murphy (Code 345) (757) 444-3520, Ext. 7125 (DSN 564) e-mail: lmurphy@safetycenter.navy.mil Information for this article was provided by HMC(FMF) Tarsy Shordon and Lt. Elizabeth Jackson, SC, who are assigned to USS Oldendorf (DD 972). New Life Preserver, Same Old Stock Number The new Mk-1 life preserver has a nylon zipper instead of snaps, expanded pockets for the dye marker and strobe light, and a redesigned opening to fit both existing and new inflators. About the only things still the same are the stock number and PMS requirements. Users can thank ComNavSeaSysCom for the newly designed Mk-1 preservers. You also can thank them for a chemical-pill auto-inflator, which has been evaluated aboard surface ships. The new inflator is an approved alternative to the existing auto-inflator, and it costs a lot less, too--$25 per copy, as opposed to $112. The new auto-inflator also can be used more than once. Another advantage is that it doesn't use an explosive charge to actuate the CO2 cylinder. The chemical-pill auto-inflator assembly (TNIC 1HM 0099-LL-H53 7707) consists of the inflator with two gaskets. The cap nut (NSN 5310-01-030-9217) and the CO2 cylinder (NSN 4220-00-543-6693) that are used with the existing auto inflators are to be used with the chemical-pill model. Chemical pills (TNIC 1HM 0099-LL-H53 7708) are available in packs of 10 at a cost of approximately $7. You can purchase the assembly and pills directly from the manufacturer under GSA contract as follows: Lifesaving Systems Corp. 2200 Elsberry Rd. Appollo Beach, FL 33572-2289 Phone: (813) 645-2748 Fax: (813) 645-2768 Inflator Kit: GSA Part No. 470 Replacement Tablets: GSA Part No. 471 Items are shipped within ConUS via UPS ground transportation at no extra cost. However, shipments to FPO addresses or OConUS are subject to freight charges. NavSafeCen Point of Contact: BMC(SW) M. Thibault (Code 315) (757) 444-3520, Ext. 7123 (DSN 564) e-mail: mthibault@safetycenter.navy.mil "Mickey Mouse" Ears: Wear 'Em and Take Care of 'Em Many daily operations in the Navy subject people to elevated noise levels for long periods of time. One of the health effects derived from this exposure is a slowly progressive inner-ear hearing loss. In most cases, this noise-induced hearing loss is irreversible. You can avoid this problem by wearing hearing protection anytime you're in a noise-hazardous area. One of the most popular forms of hearing protection is the circumaural muff, otherwise known as "Mickey Mouse" ears. These muffs consist of two cups or dome-shaped devices attached with a padded headband, which protects the entire ear. The ear cups are made of a hard plastic shell, with a foam-cell material on the inside and pliable seals where the cups meet the head. "Mickey Mouse" ears are designed to be worn by themselves or with earplugs, depending on the decibel level of noise you are exposed to. Although popular, "Mickey Mouse" ears also are greatly abused and neglected. You can find them lying in the sun, under a truck seat, stuffed in a desk drawer, or hanging from a steam pipe. A single person or an entire division may use the same rotational pool of "Mickey Mouse" ears, with some people trying to secure exclusive use by carving or painting the outer shell with initials or designs. These practices, while creative, tend to weaken the protective shell and speed the deterioration of the foam padding and insulation that provide comfort and noise protection. As part of the Navy's hearing-conservation program, supervisors and safety petty officers should regularly inspect all PPE, including "Mickey Mouse" ears. The headband should be smooth, without any sharp edges, and it shouldn't be bent. The ear pads should be soft and pliable. The foam-lining inner shells should be intact and pliable. Unless you work in a place where every piece of equipment is less than a month old, you'll undoubtedly find "Mickey Mouse" ears that do not meet these requirements. When that happens, do you ignore the problem, replace the entire ears, or install rebuilding kits? If you're smart, you choose the last alternative. A new pair of ears costs $10 to $20, while rebuilding kits cost less than $4 each. The kits usually come in two-piece replacement ear pads (NSN 4240-00-979-4040) and acoustical sponges (NSN 5965-00-674-5379), and are available through the supply system. The process of installing the new kits is simple; the key is not to force any part. First, remove the old padding and insulation. Next, wash the shell and headband, using a mild soap and water. Dry the pieces with a soft cloth. Now, install the ear pads by fitting one side of the pad lip onto the shell and work it around, much as you would a bicycle tire. Do not put the insulating foam in first, or you'll cause finger-hole damage to it. When installing the foam, make sure you place it correctly inside the domes, with the longer sides of the foam parallel to the longer sides of the ear domes. When weighing whether to rebuild or completely replace "Mickey Mouse" ears, keep in mind it takes only three to five minutes to replace both the pads and the foam inserts. The more important point to remember, however, is to do one or the other. You can't replace hearing loss. Take the first line of defense now by making sure your hearing-protection devices work and wear them every time you go into a noise-hazardous area. NavSafeCen Point of Contact: Lt. L. Murphy (Code 345) (757) 444-3520, Ext. 7125 (DSN 564) e-mail: lmurphy@safetycenter.navy.mil Some information for this article came from HMC(FMF) Tarsy Shordon aboard USS Oldendorf (DD 972).